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The Changing Common Law
I am very pleased and honoured to have been asked to participate in
this centennial celebration. For me, it underlines the common bonds
between the people of Canada and of the United States, who, in
spite of various stresses and strains, manage to live side by side in
peace and mutual respect. May we continue to set an example for
the rest of the world.
Until I read John Willis' very interesting history of Dalhousie
Law School, I had not fully realized that I am here simply as another
link in a long-standing relationship between Dalhousie and Harvard
Law Schools. At the very beginning, in 1883, as Professor Willis
tells us, three emissaries from Dalhousie visited the Harvard Law
School, and, as a result, "there is a persistent local tradition to the
effect that the School's founders drew their inspiration from the
Harvard Law School." Indeed, in his inaugural address, Weldon
"pa[id] a glowing tribute" to the law school in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Dean Horace Read, Professor Willis also noted, was responsible
for the view that Dalhousie Law School was "modelled explicitly
on the Harvard Law School." But, says Willis, "there is no
historical evidence behind the assertion." Dean Read was simply
"addicted to viewing Dalhousie Law School through a rainbow,
and preferably a Harvard rainbow." The evidence, he concludes,
"runs in an entirely opposite direction." While the curriculum at
Harvard was organized around private law subjects, the really
distinctive characteristic of the new Dalhousie Law School "was its
original emphasis on public law subjects - Constitutional History,
International Law and Conflict of Laws."I
I begin this way because it underlines the fact that, as Professor
Risk suggested yesterday, Canadian legal culture appears from the
beginning to have been dramatically different from that of both
England and America. When Dalhousie Law School was founded,
the common law, like England, was at the zenith of its prestige and
power. And yet, for reasons that Canadian legal historians are just
beginning to explore, its private law emphasis seems to have been
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1. J. Willis, A History of Dalhousie Law School 31 (1979).
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rejected, consciously or unconsciously. While I surely do not know
enough to explain Canadian developments, I hope you will listen to
my description of the common law as it existed in the late nineteenth
century, keeping in mind that it has been suggested that perhaps this
was the path not taken in Canada.
What have been the changes in the common law of the United
States during this first century of Dalhousie's existence? The most
basic change is that it is less important, both practically and
symbolically. Today, it seems hard to imagine that the great state
common law judges of the nineteenth century, like Shaw and
Cooley, were almost as well known among their contemporaries as
the constitutional giants, such as Marshall and Story. By contrast,
from the time that Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of
Appeals ascended the United States Supreme Court bench just over
fifty years ago, only one common law judge, Roger Traynor of
California, has miraculously transcended the obscurity to which
destiny has consigned these oracles of the common law in the
twentieth century. Law students in the United States can recite the
names and opinions of many lower federal judges; rarely can they
do the same for state common law judges.
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., could become famous by
writing a very difficult book on the common law. The success of the
book in fact reflected a striking revival of the cultural authority of
the common law, which had laboured defensively under the shadow
of anti-British nationalism from the time of the American
Revolution. This powerful resurgence of the prestige of the
common law was accompanied by intense nativism and ang-
lophilism, which became one of the dominant American responses
to the waves of immigration from southern and eastern Europe
during the late nineteenth century.
Holmes' book was drawn from a series of lectures that traced the
most complex and obscure twists and turns in the history of the
common law. Yet, it appears that an educated lay audience was
familiar enough with its material to be able to follow at least its
basic outline. Indeed, if one looks at volumes of general periodicals
published earlier in the century, such as the North American
Review, one finds fairly technical arguments, directed to a
nonlegally trained audience, on such topics as the merits of a
common law system versus a system of legislative codification.
Today, the common law is no longer a part of general elite
culture, as it was in both England and America in the nineteenth
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century. Indeed, the idea that, in some sense, the common law
represented an integrated system of law - that it hung together at
some deep level - is no longer shared either by lawyers or lay
persons, by practitioners or scholars. And the forms of legal
literature reflect this.
For a hundred years - roughly those between the publication of
the first volume of Kent's Commentaries on American Law in 1826
and Williston's text on contracts in 1920 - American legal
literature was dominated by the treatise tradition. Kent's
Commentaries was an effort to demonstrate that, in the quaint
language of the day, law was a "science", or, in other words, that it
was capable of generalization, systemization, and rational classifi-
cation. The treatise tradition emerged in direct opposition to the
codification movement of the 1820s and 1830s, which insisted that,
since law was political, it should be promulgated in a democratic
society by legislatures, not by courts.
2
For roughly one hundred years, the dominance of the treatise
tradition expressed the increase in the authority of the common law
and its autonomy from democratic politics. This vision of the
separation of law and politics reached its highpoint under Langdell's
influence at Harvard Law School during the 1870s and 1880s, for
Langdell based both the case method and the common law
curriculum on the dogma that "law is a science. ' 3 The apparent
refusal of Weldon to take this path at Dalhousie suggests that he
rejected the sharp distinctions between law and politics and between
public and private law that were becoming central to the legal
consciousness in both England and America during the late
nineteenth century. Perhaps the supreme manifestation of the
triumph of this view of the common law in England was the
extremely formalistic declaration of the House of Lords that it did
not have the authority to overrule earlier precedents, a view that
persisted for almost a century until it was disavowed some fifteen
years ago by the law lords themselves.
4
By 1900, the view of the common law as being self-contained,
neutral, and apolitical - which is what the word "scientific" was
2. C.M. Cook, The American Codification Movement (1981).
3. Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School (1979), 23 Am. J. Legal Hist. 329.
4. London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council, (1894) A.C. 489
(infallibility established); "practice statement" by Chancellor, Lord Gardener
(1966), 1 Weekly Law Reports 1234 (infallibility overruled); see J.P. Dawson, The
Oracles of the Law (1968), pp. 90-95.
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meant to communicate - had prevailed completely in the United
States. Then things began to change. Beginning early in this
century, the Progressive Movement attacked the claims that the
common law enjoyed political neutrality, and associated it with the
majority of the most terrible ills of industrial capitalism. Then,
during the 1920s, the legal realist movement began to undermine
the intellectual foundations of the claims of the common law to be
"scientific".
In the crisis between labour and capital, which broke out in the
1870s and which, by the 1890s, resembled European class conflict
for the first time in American history, the common law was
increasingly perceived as unfair. The notorious labour injunction
provided one example of the partisanship of common law courts. 5
Another example was the area of workmen's injuries, where the
prevailing negligence standard was reinforced both by the fellow
servant rule and the doctrine of assumption of risk. At the turn of the
century, the law of torts was frequently denounced as a mere
instrument of industrial capitalism, and the triumph of workmen's
compensation systems in most states was, by the 1920s, a direct
rejection both of common law negligence doctrine and of courts as
institutions capable of the fair administration of schemes for the
alleviation of industrial accidents. 6 The Progressive Movement's
critique of the earlier twentieth century was thus shaped by struggles
over picketing, strikes, and workmen's injuries. It culminated in the
legal realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, which denied that
law and politics could be separated or that the common law could be
neutral and apolitical.
Legal realism was itself an expression of important structural
changes that had taken place in the position of the common law.
From the time of the Civil War, there were periodic shifts in power
from the states to the federal government. If judge-made common
law was distinctively state law, expanded federal authority was
largely a product of statutory law. Indeed, the doctrine that there
was no federal common law was an important expression of the
post-revolutionary Jeffersonian hostility to governmental centraliza-
tion.
5. A.M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law (1960), pp. 104-158; F.
Frankfurter and N. Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
6. L.M. Friedman and J. Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents (1967), 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50.
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But the shifts from state to federal authority and from common
law to statute law were themselves symptomatic of still more basic
change that resulted from the rise of economic regulation. Indeed,
as I hope to argue, the decline of the cultural and political authority
of the common law during the last century has marched hand in
hand with the rise of the bureaucratic, regulatory, corporate,
welfare state.
More than anything else, the common law, both ideologically and
practically, reflected a preregulatory world and was thus incapable,
without drastic modification, of doing more than serve as a mere
appendage to any system of extensive regulation. The common law
in the nineteenth century was the legal accompaniment to the vision
in political economy of a natural, self-executing market system, in
which, as if by an invisible hand, private greed and public welfare
were brought into harmony. The common law of property, contract,
and tort was thought to be simply facilitative of that system. It was
private or voluntary law. It was conceived of as fundamentally
different from public or regulatory law, which was not only
coercive, but which in most instances was regarded as expressing
the illegitimate desires of popular legislatures to interfere with a
natural and neutral economic system. If public law thus represented
illicit state intervention and the dangers of the unnatural
redistribution of wealth, private law - the common law - was
treated as a neutral expression of the natural order of things. The
common law was regarded as being voluntary and noncoercive.
Legal thinkers sought to argue that the twin principles of will and
fault were the only legitimate basis for the state to intervene in
relations between meum and teum. In short, the common law was
regarded as the perfect accompaniment to the triumph of
laissez-faire principles in political economy.
7
The late nineteenth century thus represented the pinnacle of the
glorification of the common law as the legal expression of political
and economic individualism. Never before had legal thinkers had
more grandiose aspirations for integrating wider and wider spheres
of legal transactions under one heading. The law of contract, for
example, was redesigned to reflect an intellectual grandiosity
unheard of before. If you asked a legal practitioner in the early
nineteenth century to tell you about the law of contract, he would
have described the various functional classifications of the law:
7. J.C. Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law (1890).
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insurance law, the law of master-servant, the law of common
carriers, and the law of sales. By contrast, in the late nineteenth
century most of these areas were almost entirely subordinated to one
general abstract system of contract law which centered on the new
categories of offer and acceptance and consideration. In actuality,
all of the other areas had yielded to the insatiable claims of the law
of sales, which had become generalized to represent all of contract
law. The premier example of a competitive market transaction -
the sale of commodities - was projected as the paradigm for,
among others, labour law, consumer law, and landlord-tenant law.
This is only the most dramatic example of the surge of generalizing,
integrating, and abstracting designs that the late nineteenth century
legal thinkers deployed in order to render the common law a
virtually exclusive system.
8
Tort law was also redesigned and reconceptualized so as to
submerge existing functional categories, such as carriers, and
injuries to persons and to property. 9 Under the influence of Holmes
in the United States and Pollock in England, the modern tripartite
distinction between intentional, negligent, and strict liability torts
was created. Both Holmes and Pollock sought further to confine
strict liability to a small corner of the law of torts. They wrote
articles trying to explain that the strict liability of common carriers
or of the master for the tort of his servant or, indeed, of the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher were either anomolies or anachronisms in the
law. 1 0 In principle, they wished to subordinate the entire law of
torts to the negligence principle. They feared strict liability as
permitting the dangerous public law principle of redistribution of
wealth to enter the sacred precincts of the private law.
Whether this architectural revolution in the law was the effect of
the collapse of the forms of action is a more difficult question than
has been generally realized. Suffice it to say that the writ system,
which for hundreds of years had presented the common law as being
fragmented, compartmentalized, and extremely particularistic,
suddenly yielded to a passion for systematic integration that sought
to bring the common law into touch with the deepest currents in
8. G. Gilmore, Death of Contract (1974), pp. 97-98; G.E. White, Tort Law in
America (1980), pp. 20-62.
9. Holmes, Agency (1891), 5 Harv. L. Rev. 14; Common Carriers and the
Common Law (1879), 13 Am. L. Rev. 609; The Theory of Torts (1873), 7 Am. L.
Rev. 660.
10. Dalton, Rylands v. Fletcher: The Case in Context (unpublished manuscript).
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social Darwinism, natural rights, political theory, and the extreme
individualism of the laissez-faire political economy.
Built deeply into the ideological structure of the common law
was, thus, a hostility to statutory change, as being artificial
interference with a natural order, and to legislative and administra-
tive regulation, as representing the dangerous "political" effort to
redistribute property or otherwise distort a neutral economic order.
The central distinction between public and private law was
reinforced by doctrines of civil procedure that expressed the idea
that the civil lawsuit was a matter between private individuals and
had nothing to do with more general social goals. Rules of joinder
and standing, for example, emphasized the bipolar or private
character of the lawsuit.' The declaratory judgment was attacked
as judicial legislation. 12 Use of the common law to vindicate any
so-called public interest was thought to unwisely invite judges to
engage in legislative regulation. And, by the end of the nineteenth
century, the "decadence of equity", as Roscoe Pound put it,
1 3
reflected a flight not only from the common law's more paternalist,
organicist, or communitarian substantive history, but also from the
more free-wheeling regulatory pattern of its own procedural history.
Only in the case of the notorious labour injunction did otherwise
committed laissez-faire judges embrace the regulatory traditions of
equity.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the primacy of the common
law should have come under attack in an age of regulation. The rise
of administrative regulation in the United States, for example, was
accompanied by criticism of the common law as being incapable,
because of its extreme particularism and individualism, of
performing sustained regulatory functions.
The legal realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s represented
the effort of progressive legal intellectuals to discredit the
anti-regulatory premises of the common law. Their attack on
common law orthodoxy remains, fifty years later, the most
powerful criticism of the contemporary ideological biases of the
common law,' 4 and every current attempt at reconstruction and
11. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation (1976), 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281.
12. Anway v. Grand Rapids R.R. (1920), 211 Mich. 592.
13. Pound, The Decadence ofEquity (1905), 5 Colum. L. Rev. 20.
14. E.A. Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory 74 (1973).
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reconstitution of common law argument must squarely face the legal
realist attack on its foundations.
First and foremost was the legal realist challenge to the scientific,
neutral, and apolitical claims of orthodox legal reasoning.
Beginning with Holmes' famous attack on conceptualism -
"general propositions", he proclaimed, "do not decide concrete
cause" - legal intellectuals from John Dewey to Felix Cohen
demonstrated the discretionary and political character of common
law reasoning. 15 Whether it was the theory of precedent or the
nature of legal deduction and analogy, the legal realists attacked the
pretentions of orthodoxy to scientific or apolitical modes of
reasoning. In the legal realist critique of legal reasoning, we see the
most sustained and brilliant challenge in three hundred years to the
insistence of common lawyers that law and politics could be
separated. There had been nothing like it since Thomas Hobbes
heaped scorn on Sir Edward Coke's efforts at distinguishing the
"artificial reason" of the common lawyer from the "natural
reason" of the layman.' 6
After their challenge of the autonomous character of common law
reasoning, the legal realists offered a sustained attack on the values
that were implicit within the common law method. First, they
maintained that, in its hostility to regulation, the common law was
out of touch with the needs of industrial society. By purporting to
provide justice in the individual case, common law judges had
rendered themselves incapable of creating general rules to regulate
large numbers of cases. The structural problems of industrial
society, they insisted, required a public law, regulatory mentality
that was fundamentally inconsistent with subtle efforts at finding
individual distinctions between cases or with seeking to identify
individual fault or will in a particular transaction. Justice in the
individual case was just too slow and costly. 17
Perhaps more important, the common law had gradually been
shaped to correspond to the assumption that all individuals had
15. J. Dewey, Logical Method and Law (1924), 10 Cornell L.Q. 17; F.S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1936), 35 Colum. L. Rev.
809.
16. T. Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common
Laws of England, J. Cropsey, ed., (1971), pp. 54-57.
17. M. Cohen, The Basis of Contract (1933), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553; Property and
Sovereignty (1927), 13 Cornell L.Q. 8; J.M. Landis, The Administrative Process
(1938).
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equal bargaining power in the market. 18 Many ancient protective
and paternalistic doctrines of equity had been eliminated or deprived
of vitality by the assumption of equal bargaining power. The
regulatory state emerged to challenge the view of late nineteenth
century freedom of contract doctrine, which held that labourers or
consumers or urban tenants could in fact protect themselves in the
marketplace.
The rise of the corporation to dominant economic power in the
late nineteenth century undermined the individualistic premises of
the common law method. Indeed, it is very striking to watch
common law judges attempt to apply the individually oriented
categories of will and fault to the corporation. If one wishes to
locate the actual historical moment that traditional common law
categories began to unravel, it is in the period during the decades
after the Civil War, when the corporation became the central
economic actor and the traditional common law became inpreas-
ingly incapable of dealing with its presence. 19
It must be understood that conceptualism and formalism
collapsed in the twentieth century not because they were "wrong"
in some scientifically demonstrable sense, but because they were no
longer able to draw on views in science and philosophy that
legitimated the theory that judges passively discovered the law. The
disintegration of a religiously based theory of law, the collapse of an
objective theory of causation in science, and the attacks of
pragamatism on philosophical essentialism, mathematical deduc-
tion, and the integrity of categories contributed to the erosion of
legal formalism. 20 I am afraid to say that I believe that not even
philosophers of the stature of Rawls, Nozick, or Dworkin can
succeed in putting Humpty-Dumpty together again. And so the legal
realist challenge to the autonomous character of law remains with us
always.
The most basic symptoms of the success of the legal realist
challenge is the appearance of "balancingtests" in dozens of areas
of the law during the early decades of the twentieth century. In
constitutional law, in anti-trust law, in nuisance law, and in the law
of negligence, balancing tests replaced formal rules purporting to
18. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State (1923),
38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470; Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909), 18 Yale 454.
19. E. Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897). This is a theme that I
will document and elaborate on in a book on which I am currently at work.
20. Purcell, supra, note 14 at pp. 47-73.
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establish bright line boundaries. 21 It was Holmes who redrew the
map of legal thought from a picture of class-bounded categories to a
vision that all legal phenomena are arranged along a continuum.
Holmes argued, for example, that there was a fundamental
conflict between property and competition in anti-trust cases that
could not be solved through deductive legal reasoning. 22 Only a
balancing could work. Similarly, he challenged the notion that the
rights of labour could be deduced from the rights of property owners
to limit picketing. Only a balance between the two prima facie
legitimate interests could work. 23 Holmes is also famous for
introducing a balancing test - the famous "clear and present
danger" standard - into free speech doctrine. 24 In the earlier,
pre-Holmes vision, each legal event could in principle be assigned
to its correct category. In the post-Holmesian universe, legal
reasoning must resort to balancing tests and line-drawing. Questions
of kind have become transformed into questions of degree. For
example, the collapse of a qualitative direct/indirect distinction and
its replacement by a quantitative flow of commerce standard in
commerce clause adjudication ran parallel to developments in a
large number of different fields of law.
25
The rise of balancing tests made common law courts ever more
vulnerable to the charge that they were simply "doing politics",
that in fact the choice of appropriate weights and measures
necessary for any process of balancing is no different from what
legislatures do. No longer able to fall back on a traditional system of
legal thought that sought to create an immaculate distance between
law and politics, common law courts became increasingly
vulnerable to criticism of their underlying political values.
21. Schenck v. United States (1919), 249 U.S. 47; Standard Oil v. United States
(1911), 221 U.S. 1; Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp. (1934) 54 R.I. 411, 173 A.
627; United States v. Carroll Towing (1947) (2d. Cir.) 159 F. (2d) 169; Terry,
Negligence (1915), 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40.
22. Northern Securities v. United States (1904), 193 U.S. 197 (Holmes J.,
dissenting).
23. O.W. Holmes, "Privilege, Malice, and Intent", in Collected Legal Papers
(1920), pp. 127-128; Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), 167 Mass. 92 (Holmes J.,
dissenting).
24. Holmes quite self-consciously modeled Schenck on his balancing views in
negligence law and the criminal law of attempts.
25. United States v. E.C. Knight (1895), 156 U.S. I (qualitative distinction);
Stafford v. Wallace (1922), 258 U.S. 495; Swift & Co. v. United States (1905),
196 U.S. 375 (quantitative distinction).
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All of this has resulted in a more modest role for the common law
in the regulatory state. As the common law has moved from its
nineteenth century position as the grand legitimator of market
capitalism to a more subordinate and residual role in the corporate,
welfare, regulatory state, it has gradually allowed us to see that,
nevertheless, there is still no escaping from its function of providing
background law against which to understand and interpret statutory
and administrative regulation. In much the same way as common
law judges, after the abolition of the forms of action or after the
merger of law and equity, could not escape the distinctions between
trespass and case, general and special assumpsit, or law and equity,
so too in the age of the statute and of administrative regulation it is
impossible to engage in the task of "interpretation" independently
of common law categories. There are now entire areas of the federal
law which Judge Henry Friendly has identified as "general common
law". 26 They are judicially developed rules and standards that
purport to derive from interpretation of a very generally worded
statute. In fact, statutory interpretation under these circumstances is
strikingly difficult to distinguish from common law modes of
reasoning. The process of judicial interpretation of the meaning of
statutory prohibitions of, for example, "unfair competition" or
"contracts in restraint of trade" may fundamentally be no different
from pristine common law adjudication in the good old days.
Indeed, the judiciary may now be less restrained, because it
purports merely to interpret the legislature's views, than it was
when it needed to take direct responsibility for "declaring" the
common law. In any event, statutory interpretation creates a new
opportunity for those who wish to see judging as neutral and
apolitical to maintain that all that the judge is doing is simply
"discovering" or "declaring" the will of the legislature. In reality,
the words of a statute often constitute a Rorschach onto which the
judges simply project their own fantasies of desirable policy. There
are, of course, other institutional constraints. But to maintain that a
coherent law/politics distinction can be made to correspond to
traditional separation-of-power ideas about the distinction between
legislation and adjudication strikes me as silly. The distinction
between law-making and law-applying in traditional discourse
describes the process of statutory interpretation in the regulatory
26. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law (1964),
39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383.
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state no more accurately than traditional common law judging could
be represented as mere "discovery" of the law. Both involve choice
among values, which is not entirely different from what legislators
do.
So, like the country from which it came, the common law entered
the second half of the twentieth century shorn of its former imperial
glory and deprived of its aristocratic pretentions by the humdrum
reality imposed by its new historical situation. While it can no
longer command awe and reverence as in days of yore, there are still
some who continue to speak in grandiose tones, as if the empire
remains intact, and who refuse to acquiesce in a humbler and more
modest role. Fortunately, these nostalgic few usually enact their
delusions of imperial grandeur only on celebratory occasions, surely
a more harmless means of remembering the past than going to war
over distant islands, but equally as detached from reality.
Nevertheless, the common law, bowed and humbled, does
continue to exact a different, more subtle kind of loyalty. As I need
not remind a Canadian audience, cultural influence often continues
long after the empire has been dismantled. The Privy Council
commands respect long after its power to overrule is regarded as
inconsistent with the dignity of a sovereign nation. And the
authority of modes of thinking lingers on long after the Constitution
is brought home.
So, in an age of regulation, common law method continues to
structure the ways of understanding of lawyers, of judges, and of
legislators. Like the effects of a common language on the structure
of thought, the common law tradition affects our sensibilities at
almost pre-rational levels. Here is the continuing power of the
common law.
